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1. Introduction
Market  reforms  have  posed  similar  challenges  to  trade  unions
worldwide. In this regard, the current situation in Argentina does not
differ from the global trend. De-industrialisation, de-centralisation of
collective bargaining, reduction of the formal sector, flexibility in the
labour  market  and the use of  labour  power  have all  affected trade
unions’ capacity to mobilise workers and play a major progressive role
in society.
In addition, particularly over the last decade, the effects of thirty
years of economic liberalisation combined with an explosion in the
rate of unemployment has led to mass poverty and enormous class
divisions, changing the landscape of social mobilisation in Argentina.
On the one hand, mass unemployment disciplined wage-labourers; on
the other, new territorial organisations, mainly of those workers now
unemployed – the so-called piqueteros (for picket) – have proliferated
and sustained the virulent social protests for employment and social
programmes which characterised the country at the turn of the century.
In this context, scholars have tended to assume the definitive demise
of trade unions and their methods of struggle, turning their attention to
the new social movements.
Signs of trade union revitalisation however,  composed of both
traditional and innovative aspects, have emerged in recent years. This
chapter evaluates the old and the new, embedded in the indicators of
this incipient revitalisation, bearing in mind that in Argentina today
any analysis  of  the  limits  and prospects  for  trade unions and their
Maurizio Atzeni and Pablo Ghigliani
relevance  within  society  intersect  with  the  analysis  of  the  broader
process of the social mobilisation of the subaltern classes. 
2. Signs of Revitalisation
Objective indices of trade union revitalisation are often contentious.
Nevertheless, union density, labour conflicts and collective bargaining
are among the indicators that scholars frequently use to assess union
power.  The  reunification  of  the  main  workers  confederation  of
Argentina,  the  Confederación  General  de  Trabajadores  (CGT),  is
arguably  another  sign  of  trade  union  revitalisation.  Each  of  these
aspects will be briefly evaluated in the following sections.
Union Density
Reliable figures on union density are problematic in Argentina. Trade
unions  have  always  overestimated  membership  levels,  public
authorities  have not  kept  periodic  records,  scholars  have used very
different sources and methodologies, and thus their research outcomes
are  hardly comparable.  Yet,  according to  available  estimates,  while
total membership has fallen, the decline in union density has not been
dramatic in the last two decades, despite the wide-ranging process of
state  and capital  counter-mobilisation (Table  1).  This  is  even more
surprising in  a  country  where  incentives  for  organising  are  scarce:
union finances do not depend exclusively on members fees; there is a
legal  monopoly  of  collective  bargaining  representation  granted  by
public  authorities  to  the  largest  union  (personería  legal),  which
eliminates  inter-union disputes;  collective agreements  apply also to
non-union  members;  demands  are  often  channelled  through
institutional  mechanisms  of  political  exchange;  and  the  mobilising
capacity of trade unions goes far beyond their memberships.
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Table 1 Trade Union Density in Argentina
Year % union density 
(Lamadrid and Orsatti 1991)
1954 48 
1963 40 
1974 43 
1979 42 
1982-83 41 
1989 44 
% union density 
(Marshall and Perelman 2004)
1990 47 
1991-94 44-47
2001 42 
It is also necessary to take into account the number of unregistered
wage-labourers,  who  do  not  have  the  possibility  of  joining  trade
unions  with  personería  gremial,  due  to  the  legal  features  of  the
Argentinean system of industrial relations. At the beginning of 2006,
44.3  per  cent  of  the  total  number  of  wage-labourers  was  in  this
condition,  whereas  from  1992  to  1996  the  rate  of  unregistered
employees oscillated between 22 and 25 per cent. Thus, union density
among unionisable  workers  remains  high,  whereas  more  and more
wage labourers cannot be organised by trade unions.
Labour Conflicts
The  first  positive  sign  of  trade  union  revitalisation  has  been  the
increasing rate of labour conflicts. Although not all such conflicts are
necessarily  trade  union  initiatives,  given  the  monopoly  of
representation, trade unions often end up leading, or at least involved
in industrial actions. 2005 witnessed a peak in labour conflicts, only
surpassed  twice  since  1980  –  in  1988  and  1990,  both  of  which
represented  periods  of  high  inflation.  The  trend  toward  increased
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industrial conflict continued in the first half of 2006, though at a lower
level. 
Table 2 Labour Conflicts, 1980-2005
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
years
co
nf
lic
ts
 
Source: Nueva Mayoría.
Collective Bargaining
2004  and  2005  witnessed  record  levels  of  collective  bargaining
agreements, and the trend carried on into 2006 (Table 3). In 2005, the
568 new agreements included under their coverage 2,117,000 workers,
that is, 47 per cent of the total number of formal wage-labourers. This
phenomenon  can  be  considered  another  index  of  trade  union
revitalisation.
Table 3 Collective Agreements Classified by Scope
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Year Scope of negotiations Total
Activity / sector Firm
1991 79 18 97
1992 165 44 209
1993 127 91 218
1994 98 104 202
1995 71 125 196
1996 45 107 152
1997 41 167 208
1998 30 189 219
1999 32 152 184
2000 12 64 76
2001 22 128 150
2002 27 181 208
2003 n/d n/d n/d
2004 112 236 348
2005 203 365 568
Source: Ministry of Labour
The  1990s  had  marked  the  end  of  the  centralisation  of  collective
bargaining  which  had  been  the  distinctive  feature  of  industrial
relations  in  Argentina.  Between  1991  and  1994,  62.5  per  cent  of
collective  agreements  were  negotiated  for  the  entire  sector,  while
between 1994 and 1999 only 23.3 per cent were reached at that level,
with the remaining agreements at firm level. This decentralisation of
collective  bargaining  allowed  capitalists  to  push  through
flexibilisation  and  productivity  deals.  Collective  agreements  during
the  1990s  introduced  flexibility  in  the  employment  relationship
through diverse  types  of  temporary contracts,  in  the  distribution of
working hours, in the organisation of work, and in the composition of
wages. Trade unions usually adopted a defensive posture, giving into
flexibility  at  the  firm level  in  exchange for  maintaining control  of
collective  bargaining  and  the  administration  of  one  of  the  key
resources  of  trade  union  power  in  Argentina:  the  obras  sociales
(health institutions financed by the workers and the employers).
Although decentralisation still prevails in collective bargaining,
there  has  been  a  recent  increase  in  sectoral  level  agreements.
Collective bargaining at this level has a direct positive consequence in
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the scope of coverage. During 2005, 36 per cent of such agreements
comprised  92  per  cent  of  the  wage-labourers  who  benefited  from
collective  negotiations.  Moreover,  93  per  cent  of  these  agreements
resulted  in  wage  increases  against  78  per  cent  of  the  agreements
reached at  firm level.  Lastly,  since 2003 the percentage of  clauses
introducing flexibility, internal (mobility, multi-skill,  hours of work,
performance  related  pays,  and  so  forth)  or  external  (temporary  or
flexible  contracts),  has  decreased  in  comparison  to  the  1990s.  By
contrast,  the  number  of  clauses  covering  relationships  between
workers  and  employers,  and  the  place  of  the  trade  union  in  this
relationship, has grown.
The Reunification of the CGT
Finally,  the  reunification  in  2004  of  the  principal  Argentinean
confederation,  the  CGT,  can be  regarded as  a  political-institutional
index of trade union revitalisation. Since the mid 1940s, with the rise
of  the  political  movement  known  as  Peronism,  the  unity  of  trade
unions in a single CGT was the main strategic aim of Peronist union
leaders, who imposed themselves as the hegemonic force among the
working  classes  in  Argentina.  Still,  governmental  interventions,
dictatorial  prohibitions  and  transitory  divisions  of  the  CGT  were
commonplace  after  the  1955  when  the  president  Perón  was
overthrown in a military coup. 1992 witnessed a true novelty, the rise
of a rival organisation, the Central de Trabajadores Argentinos (CTA),
in opposition to the hesitant or even critically supportive attitude of
the CGT in the face of the deepening neo-liberal agenda. The CTA
obtained  partial  recognition  (inscripción  gremial)  from  the
Government in 1997. While the inscripción gremial  falls short of the
protection guaranteed by the personería gremial, it is often a first step
in the struggle for full recognition. The challenge of the CTA brought
about  tensions within the  CGT,  and in  1994 led to  the  rise  of  the
Movimiento  de  Trabajadores  Argentinos  (MTA)  in  opposition  to
governmental policies. This internal struggle ended in 2000 with the
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effective division  of  the  CGT into  a  dialogue-oriented  CGT (CGT
dialoguista)  and  a  more  combative  CGT (CGT rebelde),  the  latter
built upon the MTA faction. Thus the 1990s was a period of division
and fragmentation for the Argentine labour movement. In this context
it  is  worth  noting  too  the  emergence  of  the  Corriente  Clasista  y
Combativa (CCC),  a  minor Marxist  central  with influence in  some
regions,  mainly  in  the  north  of  the  country.  Thus  the  recent
reunification of the two CGTs,  although far from achieving the old
unity  of  the  labour movement,  is  a  major  event  in  the  Argentine
political scenario.
3. The Socio-Economic  and Political  Context  of Trade Union
Revitalisation
Between  1991  and  1994,  despite  the  gradual  rise  in  the  rate  of
unemployment,  statistics  showed a  simultaneous decline in  poverty
levels and the growth of real wages. The ‘tequila effect’ caused by the
Mexican  crisis,  however,  ended  this  ambiguous  evolution.
Unemployment deepened,  poverty jumped and real wages began to
decline (Table 4). 
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Table 4 Gross  Economic  Product,  real  wages,  unemployment,
underemployment and people under poverty line (May wave)
year
GDP at
constant
 Prices
real wages in
manufacturing unemployment
Under
employment
people under
poverty line
1960=100 1960=100
1986 220.2 121.7 5.9 n/d n/d
1987 225.1 112.7 6.0 8.2 n/d
1988 220.7 105.1 6.5 7.8 29.8
1989 205.3 88.6 8.1 8.6 25.9
1990 202.5 79.0 8.6 9.3 42.5
1991 223.8 76.6 6.9 8.6 28.9
1992 246.8 81.6 6.9 8.3 19.3
1993 261.5 83.0 9.9 8.8 17.7
1994 276.7 84.7 10.7 10.2 16.1
1995 268.9 80.6 18.4 11.3 22.2
1996 283.7 80.8 17.1 12.6 26.7
1997 306.7 77.9 16.1 13.2 26.3
1998 318.5 76.6 13.2 13.3 24.3
1999 307.8 77.4 14.5 13.7 27.1
2000 305.3 78.5 15.4 14.5 29.7
2001 291.9 77.7 16.4 14.9 32.7
2002 260.1 62.2 21.5 18.6 49.7
2003 283.1 67.7 15.6 18.8 51.7
2004 308.0 81.8 14.8 15.2 44.3
2005 n/d n/d 13.0 12.7 33.8
2006 n/d n/d 11.4 11.0 n/d
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (INDEC).  Figures for
GDP and real wages in Iñigo Carrera (2006).
In 1997 social unrest erupted, and innovative forms of struggles, like
the  roadblocks  held  by  the  piqueteros,  spread  across  the  country,
whereas labour conflict was at its lowest point of the decade. In 1998
a negative economic cycle, which would last until  the beginning of
2003,  paved the way to the gradual radicalisation of social protest,
forcing the exit of the national government in December 2001. In this
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context labour conflicts started to intensify, though hesitantly, falling
again after the peak of the crisis, in which the rate of unemployment
climbed to 21.5 per cent (October wave), income participation of the
subaltern classes in the GDP fell from 31.5 per cent to 22.6 per cent,
and  real  wages  declined  15  percentage  points  due  to  currency
devaluation. 
Since  2003  Argentina  has  experienced  an  economic  recovery
with rates of growth oscillating around 8 to 9 per cent annually. For
trade unions there are two important consequences of this recovery.
First, the number of workers employed in the private formal sector has
increased  by  13.5  per  cent  since  2001,  thus  allowing  unions  to
maintain  their  positions  in  certain  strategic  industries  (such  as
automotive, telecommunication, energy, transport). Second, capitalists
have  been  inclined  to  concede  workers’ demands  in  the  face  of
potential disruptions to the productive process in the midst of growing
profits.  This positive economic cycle has been fertile soil  for  trade
union demands for higher salaries, both through collective bargaining
and  industrial  action.  Trade  union  negotiations  and  struggles
succeeded in raising real wages in the private sector above those of
2001, though within an uncertain climate due to inflationary pressures
(approximately 1 per cent on a monthly basis). In the public sector and
among unregistered wage-labourers however,  real  wage levels have
remained far below those of 2001. Indeed the income participation of
the whole subaltern classes has remained almost untouched, passing
from 22.6 per cent in 2002 to 25.9 per cent  in 2005,  despite GDP
growth surpassing 5.8 per cent  the 1998 figure,  the peak of 1990s.
Between 1998 and 2005, the income relation of the richest deciles to
the poorest one increased from 22.8 to 31.
Trade  unions  also  took  advantage  of  political  variables.  The
Peronist government, which assumed office in 2003, showed a greater
openness to trade union claims. At least initially, it exhibited a certain
tolerance towards social  protests,  particularly labour  conflicts.  This
attitude has been gradually changing since the second half of 2005, as
police  have  suppressed  labour  protests,  sit-in  strikes  and  factory
occupations in the provinces of Neuquén, Chaco and Santa Cruz, and
picket lines of meat workers in Buenos Aires. In turn, the government
decreed minimum wage increases, which stimulated the demands of
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highly  paid  workers.  The  Ministry  of  Labour  has  also  encouraged
collective bargaining, and recently monitored the Consejo del Salario
Mínimo,  Vital  y  Móvil,  a  tripartite  body for  social  dialogue,  which
agreed, though not unanimously, another rise in the minimum wage.
These  policies  are  aspects  of  a  hegemonic  project  by  which  the
government  has  sought  to  deactivate  the  mobilisation  of  the
piqueteros,  re-establish  some  institutional  channels  for  political
exchange with part of the labour movement, and obtain support from
popular  organisations.  The  Government  also  attempts  to  control
through  consensual  means  the  distributive  struggle  in  an  effort  to
avoid skyrocketing inflation.
In short, the end of the long economic depression, the increase of
production and economic activity, the decline of unemployment, and
the  political  and  economic  project  of  the  government,  while
functioning to restore the hegemonic control upon the broader process
of  social  mobilisation,  seem  to  have  revitalised  trade  unions’
willingness to mobilise the rank and file.
4. The Nature of Revitalisation: The Old and the New
According to the Ministry of Labour,  there are in the country 1414
trade unions with personería gremial, that is, the official recognition
that gives trade unions legal protection to their shop stewards against
dismissal, the rights to strike and represent their members in collective
bargaining, and benefit from check-off deductions. But there are also
1397 trade unions with  inscripción gremial, a different sort of legal
recognition,  which  lacking  all  the  above,  means,  in  fact,  their
exclusion  from  the  possibility  of  effectively  representing  their
members.  This discrimination  has created a system in which entire
sectors are dominated by a single powerful union. Thus the signs of
union  revitalisation  analysed  in  this  chapter  are  mostly  limited  to
unions with  personería gremial, that is, those with the legal right to
take  industrial  action  and  bargain  on  behalf  of  their  members.
Nevertheless,  the  uninterrupted  growth  in  recent  years  of  new
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organisations  asking  for  recognition  through  inscripción  gremial,
often the first step towards demanding personería gremial, or towards
challenging established organisations, is in itself another indicator of
workers’ growing mobilisation in defence of their interests.
What lies behind the recent revitalisation? In much of the English
literature,  discussion  has  focused  on  innovation  in  union  policies,
rooted in the adoption of a partnership, a servicing or an organising
profile. In Argentina, by contrast, trade union revitalisation seems to
be  associated  primarily  with  traditional  practices.  With  that
understanding,  let  us  resume  the  analysis  of  union  density,  labour
conflicts, collective bargaining and the reunification of the CGT. 
Academic  and  political  analysts  agree  that  the  Government
favoured the reunification of the CGT to empower traditional union
leaders as a safeguard against the mobilisation of the unemployed and
the  growth  of  rank  and  file’s  demands  for  wage  rises.  The  CGT
represents trade unions in the tradition of Peronism and, after years of
underground political lobbying, is currently more openly supporting
the  Government  and  its  attempt  to  settle  labour  conflicts  through
conciliatory channels and national agreements. Moreover, the Ministry
of Labour denied the personería gremial to the CTA, a main actor in
the mobilisation against the neo-liberal agenda during 1990s. The CTA
promoted  coalition  building  with  social  movements  and  political
organisations.  In  this  way,  the  CTA’s  ability  to  organise  workers
outside  the  public  sector,  where  the  central  has  its  backbone,  was
constrained  by  political  means.  This  is  significant  as  the  CTA
pioneered  through  innovative  methods  a  local  version  of  social
unionism  under  the  banner  of  trade  union  democratisation.  For
instance, the CGT has ignored unemployed and unorganised workers,
maintaining  untouched its  traditional  structures  of  organisation  and
representation. By contrast, the CTA has developed new forms: it has
a territorial organisation for the unemployed; it allows the individual
affiliation of workers; it implements direct ballots for all union posts,
gathers workers from cooperatives, and promotes the organisation of
disadvantaged groups. Additionally, since its inception, the CTA and
its  organisations  have  enriched  the  traditional  repertoire  of  labour
movement  action.  Yet  all  these  innovative  steps  are  not  enough to
break  the  hegemony  of  the  traditional  leadership  of  the  Argentine
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labour movement in the industrial and service sectors. By passing over
once  more  the  request  of  personería  gremial of  the  CTA,  the
Government  backs  the  CGT  and  its  traditional  practices,  and
reinforces its hegemonic position.
Given the monopoly of representation, the growth in the number
of collective agreements implies an opportunity for traditional union
leaderships to recover from a decade of retreat, which had damaged
their  reputations.  Collective  agreements  function  to  prevent  the
confluence of workers’ mobilisation and the broader trend of social
protest  through  a  consensual  dynamic.  In  the  past,  collective
bargaining did involve the top-down mobilisation of workers, a sort of
implied threat  in  order  to achieve better  terms and conditions.  But
genuine rank-and-file participation in collective negotiations has often
been  severely  limited  by  the  deficit  of  internal  democracy  and
freedom of association. Thus, important as it is, the invigorating of
collective  bargaining  might  soon be  reversed  following changes  in
economic  and  political  variables,  as  it  does  not  express  new
organisational strengths, new tactics or new attitudes on the side of
organised  labour.  Indeed,  it  seems  to  point  to  the  favourable
conjuncture in which old tripartite mechanisms of political exchange
are  promoted  by  public  authorities  in  the  face  of  a  process  of
mobilisation  of  the  subaltern  classes,  which  has  posed  serious
challenges to traditional leaderships.
In  the  realm  of  labour  conflicts  and  strikes,  it  is  possible  to
identify some new features that have emerged since the 1990s. For
instance,  the  number  of  workplace  structures  (the  so-called
comisiones internas) which have taken industrial action based on the
mobilisation  of  workers  through  participative  democracy,  have
increased.  Some of  them led  long  conflicts  with  significant  media
impact in various activities, including the Buenos Aires underground,
hospitals,  communications,  airlines,  and  the  meat  industry.  More
importantly,  several  trade  unions  have  been  campaigning  for  the
inclusion of outsourced workers on equal terms and conditions with
core  workers,  not  only  in  the  above-mentioned sectors  but  also  in
transport,  oil,  railways  and  various  branches  of  the  provincial,
municipal  and  national  state.  Some  of  these  campaigns  involved
solidarity action and strikes. This is a far cry from most union tactics
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during  the  1990s,  when  the  affiliation  of  outsourced  workers  was
usually  negotiated  to  compensate  membership  loss,  by  conceding
lower  terms  and conditions  and in  this  manner  contributing  to  the
division of the working class. 
Difficult  to evaluate is  the subtle though noticeable growth of
rank-and-file  activism,  manifest  by  mounting,  though  scattered
evidence:  building of workplace structures in  previously union-free
companies and struggles for recognition; more and younger activists
leading  the  conflicts;  electoral  challenges  to  well-established
leaderships;  new radical  union  groupings;  renewed attempts  to  co-
ordinate common actions with piqueteros and other social movements;
enlargement of the repertoire of actions; and so forth. 
It  is  important  not  to  exaggerate this trend.  On the one hand,
traditional leaderships conduct most conflicts in a context of economic
growth through traditional practices. On the other, trade unions’ ability
to confront employers at the workplace is very limited. Official data
shows  that  while  a  reasonable  percentage  (52.5  per  cent)  of  shop
stewards  operates  in  the  larger  companies  (with  more  than  200
employees),  their  ability  to  represent  workers  in  medium  firms
(between 40 and 200) and small enterprises (less than 40 employees)
remain very low (27.7 per cent and 7.5 per cent respectively). 
Furthermore, an evaluation of trade unions’ prospects should take
into account their place within the broader picture of social protest in
Argentina. In this regard, the leading role of trade unions has declined
in comparison to that of other organisations of the civil society. While
in  1989,  trade  union  protest  represented  74  per  cent  of  the  total
protests  recorded,  in  the  early  1990s  this  proportion  fell  to
approximately 54 per cent, and only 31 per cent of the social protests
have corresponded to trade unions’ initiatives between 1998 and 2003.
While alternative data on strikes suggests the beginnings of recovery
in 2004,  the point  remains that  the ability of trade unions to build
coalitions  with  other  social  movements  seems  to  be  a  relevant
strategic  question.  In  this  respect,  the  persistent  hegemony  of  the
traditional  leaderships  over  the  labour  movement  is  an  obstacle  to
revitalisation as they have neglected such coalitions.
As stated above, union density has not suffered dramatic decline.
Yet this says nothing about why (or how) unions have maintained their
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relative position. After their establishment as mass organisations in the
1940s  and  early  1950s,  recruiting  campaigns  have  been  rare  in
Argentina.  Since  then,  two  main  factors  explain  high  levels  of
unionisation.  Firstly,  until  the  end  of  1980s,  new  entrants  were
recruited almost automatically by comisiones internas – except under
dictatorial rule. Secondly, since the 1970s, when the trade unions with
personería  gremial  secured  by  law  the  management  of  the  obras
sociales, the latter became an additional power resource for recruiting
members,  despite  the  fact  that  both  institutions,  the  union  and the
obra social  were formally separated,  and hence union membership
was never a condition for accessing health services. During the 1990s
the  deregulation  of  the  system of  obras sociales  posed a  threat  to
unions as workers were free to choose a different  obra social. This
was expected to have a detrimental effect on poorer unions, and more
generally,  on  union  density  as  the  identity  forged  by  trade  unions
between the organisation and the obra social would be severed. Some
imagined this would lead to more active and innovative trade union
recruiting  efforts,  but  this  did  not  occur.  While  industrial  unions
reinforced the identity between the organisation and  obras sociales,
the strategy of service section unions has been to adopt a commercial
attitude focused on the improvement of the services provided by their
obras sociales and to appeal workers from other economic activities.
In this latter case, the usual losses in union density were compensated
financially by the income generated by their obras sociales. In short,
union  density  with  few exceptions  was  not  maintained  because  of
innovative organising efforts. 
5. Conclusions
The first conclusion to be drawn is that, today in Argentina, there are
concrete signals of trade union revitalisation but not of renewal. These
signs manifest the revitalisation of old trade unions’ practices, which
are  partly  a  product  of  the  economic recovery,  partly  a  product  of
Governmental  policies.  Yet  it  is  also  true  that  the  combination  of
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economic and political factors has opened new and real room for the
emergence of labour conflicts and workers’ mobilisation outside the
hegemony of the traditional leadership. Indeed it is possible to find
evidence of the latter in the series of grassroots democratic actions,
which has characterised several of the most important labour conflicts
since 2005. 
The second conclusion is that with roughly half of the country’s
population  below  the  poverty  line,  an  11.4  per  cent  rate  of
unemployment and 44.3 per cent of wage-labourers unregistered, the
relationship between trade unions and the broader process of social
mobilisation is a crucial issue for the long term prospects of the labour
movement. Trade unions’ direct involvement in the total number of
social protests has shown a pronounced decline, and the CGT remains
indifferent  to  other  social  movements,  particularly  those  of
unemployed workers. In this sense, the social unionism orientation of
the  CTA,  the  CCC  and  other  minor  organisations  is  a  positive
development, and so are the coordinated actions of trade unions and
piqueteros,  not only in protest marches, but also in labour conflicts
like  those  of  Buenos Aires  underground.  Another  example of  such
coordinated action came in defence of the occupied factory FaSinPat
(acronym for  Fábrica Sin Patrones  - factory without bosses), where
many members of unemployed organisations have been incorporated
by the trade union committed to workers’ self-management. Yet the
relationship between trade unions and other organisations of the civil
society is still very limited.
Argentina  thus  reveals  a  complex  picture  for  trade  union
revitalisation, in which the prospect for long-standing renewal seems
to  depend  on  the  multiplication  of  the  experiments  in  grassroots
democracy and coalition-building, rather than in the replication of the
old trade union practices which have prevailed thus far.
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